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Financial Market Data and MiFID 
Karel Lannoo* 
he opening-up of the market for equity market data, as foreseen in the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID), raises the question of whether data will be sufficiently consolidated and of high enough quality, or whether 
the information will become too fragmented, thereby hindering price transparency and the implementation of best 
execution policies. This policy brief outlines the market for financial market data, the provisions of MiFID and the 
implementing measures regarding financial data and data consolidation. It also looks at the approaches taken by Committee 
of European Securities Regulators, the FSA and the US authorities. It concludes that markets should be capable of 
adapting and that additional licensing requirements, such as those proposed by the FSA, are in fact premature and 
might act as a barrier to the single market. Nor does it find that a US-style monopoly consolidator would be needed. 
ne aspect of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) that is rarely discussed is its 
impact on the financial market data business. 
MiFID not only abolishes the concentration rule for trading 
of equity securities, but also for market data generated from 
these trades. Whereas today market data on equity 
transactions is primarily controlled by the exchanges, 
MiFID leaves open how and by whom this information will 
be consolidated in the future. It only says that it should be 
done on a reasonable commercial basis, and as close to real 
time as possible. This raises the question of whether the 
market will provide sufficiently consolidated market data 
by itself or whether the data will become too fragmented, 
perhaps requiring an initiative by the authorities to create a 
single consolidated tape along the lines of the US NMS 
(national market system) model devised by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
Data consolidation is an essential pre-requisite for the 
emergence of a true single market in equity trading, 
because it ensures that: 1) the law of one price holds across 
trading venues (i.e. the same security is traded at the same 
price), is a precondition for market efficiency; 2) market 
participants have equal access to price discovery, so that 
there is a level playing field as regards access to market 
information; 3) best execution can more readily be verified. 
Given that business decisions are driven by private returns 
rather than considerations of public good, it remains to be 
seen whether the industry will be able to come up with 
credible solutions to overcome coordination failures in 
achieving consolidation within an acceptable time frame, 
without regulatory intervention. Yet what is the optimal 
role for the regulator to play to this end, and what precisely 
is the scope and degree of desirable regulatory intervention 
in the field of data consolidation? These questions remain 
unanswered.  
1.  The financial market data business 
The demand for market data is dominated by a few global 
data-providers such as Bloomberg, Thomson Financial and 
Reuters, and a multitude of specialist providers, amongst 
which are the exchanges for equity and derivatives data and 
other trading platforms and trade associations. But the 
market is extremely competitive, which is reflected in the 
relatively low valuation of the incumbents, and is 
undergoing rapid change as a result of technological 
progress and regulatory developments. In addition to the IT 
companies, ratings agencies and financial media which are 
striving for a higher share of the data vending business, 
firms like Google have also indicated their interest in 
providing financial information for free. The core 
competitive strength of these firms is their ability to 
amalgamate financial information from different venues as 
rapidly and accurately as possible and to disseminate it to a 
wide range of subscribers simultaneously.  
The large data vendors generate revenues of about €2 
billion from data vending. Reuters generated income of 
about €2.8 billion from data vending (including the sale of 
research), of which about 55% comes from Europe. 
Thomson Financial generated €1.9 billion from data 
vending, predominantly in the US. Bloomberg, which is not 
listed but incorporated as a partnership (LP), provides no 
financial data about itself at all on its website, which is 
surprising for a firm that lives off selling financial 
information about others. 
By comparison, the total revenue from data vending 
reported by the six largest EU exchanges was €458 million 
(2005), which is 12% of their total revenues. The most 
important are the Deutsche Börse and the London Stock 
Exchange, with about €130 million revenues each. Over 
time, this source of revenue has stayed grosso modo within 
the same proportions for exchanges, but has moved 
according to market activity. The overall ratio, however, 
varies widely with some exchanges being much more 
dependent on trade data revenues than others (see Table 2). 
In the US, (equity) market data revenues totalled $434 
million (2004), 90% of which was shared by the self-
regulatory organisations (SROs), which are connected to 
the exchanges.
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Investment banks have not stayed on the sidelines either, 
and see a possibility in MiFID to ‘internalise’ market data 
revenues, rather than pay others for data which they 
generate themselves. In September 2006, a consortium of 
nine investment banks launched the Project Boat, a venue 
for trade-data reporting. The nine investment banks behind 
the project are ABN Amro, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley and UBS, which have about a 50% market 
share in equity trading in Europe.
2  Under existing rules, 
intermediaries must report equity trades made off-exchange 
to a recognised trading venue, i.e. the main regulated 
market in every member state. Under Project Boat, 
exploiting the opportunities created by MiFID, exchanges 
will consolidate equity trade data information pre- and 
post-trade, pre-trade to coordinate prices for shares which 
they offer in systematic internalisation, and post-trade to 
commercialise their trade information. 
Table 1. Revenues of the 3 largest data vendors versus 
3 stock exchanges’ information divisions 
€ million  2004  2005  2006 
Big Three data vendors 
Reuters Group PLC  2,284  2,372  2,485 
Bloomberg      
Thomson Financial  1,738  1,897  2,000 
Big Three stock exchange information divisions 
Deutsche Börse  122  130  n/a 
Euronext 87  94  n/a 
LSE 118  128  138 
Source: Annual reports. 
Table 2. Stock exchange revenues from trading relative to 
revenues from information sales 
Ratio  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
LSE  0.56 0.74 0.75 0.97 1.04 1.18 1.16 1.33
Euronext  3.37 3.88 2.20 5.22 5.35 5.89 5.85  
Deutsche 
Börse 
4.48 5.31 4.66 4.46 5.10 5.12 5.78  
Borsa 
Italiana 
     2.13  1.63  1.83  
OMX       4.98 3.98  3.25  3.04  
BME       6.43  6.38  7.11  
Source: Annual reports. 
2.  The MiFID regime and its implementation 
The concentration rule of the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD) not only gave the exchanges control over the market 
in trading of equity securities, but also over the market in 
trade data. With its abolition under MiFID, and the 
expected multiplication of trading venues, several questions 
arise. On the regulatory side, the issue is to what extent 
market data will remain sufficiently consolidated to allow 
the price discovery process to function efficiently. On the 
market structure side, the question is how the markets will 
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2 The information about Project Boat is based upon a presentation 
by Will Meldrum of Markit at a conference on MiFID in Brussels, 
8-9 March 2007.  
adapt: how are the banks going to react, to what extent will 
the data vending activities of exchanges be affected, what 
will the big data vendors do, and what opportunities arise in 
markets where price transparency does not yet apply. 
MiFID requires regulated markets (Art. 45), multilateral 
trading facilities (MTFs) (Art. 30) and systematic 
internalisers (Art. 28) “to make public the price, volume 
and time of the transactions” “as close to real time as 
possible” and “on a reasonable commercial basis”. For 
internalisers, the directive adds that this should also be “in a 
manner which is easily accessible to other market 
participants” (Art. 28.1). This only applies to equity 
transactions for the time being, as there is no pre- and post 
trade transparency for other financial instruments. In 
addition, recital 34 of MiFID recommends that “Member 
States remove any obstacles which may prevent the 
consolidation at European level of the relevant information 
and its publication.” 
A core issue in MiFID is thus that market data can be 
commercialised. MiFID recognises the proprietary nature 
of market data, which can lead to a fairly profound 
alternation in the structure we have in place today.
3 Art. 
28.3 specifies that investment firms can publish post-trade 
information through three avenues: through exchanges or 
MTFs; through third-party distributors (data vendors); or 
through “proprietary arrangements”. Art. 44.1 for example 
specifies that the services of exchanges can be used: 
“Regulated markets may give access, on reasonable 
commercial terms and on a non-discriminatory basis, to the 
arrangements they employ for making public the 
information to investment firms”. Precise conditions were 
left to the implementing measures.   
MiFID’s implementing regulation regime (Commission 
regulation 2004/39/EC) on the publishing of post-trade 
information of shares is essentially identical irrespective of 
the trading venue. These harmonised post-trade publication 
requirements were introduced to ensure that orders being 
routed through a particular trading venue enjoy the same 
level of transparency (at least in terms of price) as those 
being routed to other venues. Art. 27 harmonises the 
contents to be published about trades along six information 
points: trading day; trading time; instrument identification; 
price; quantity and quantity notation; and venue.
4 Art. 29 
sets a maximum of three minutes for the publication of 
post-trade information, with publication delays applying for 
large transactions,
5 and Art. 30. defines that pre- and post-
trade information can be judged to be publicly available if 
it is available through an exchange, an MTF, the facilities 
                                                        
3 The EU took a similar approach for the dissemination of price-
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(2004/109/EC), where it abolished national monopolies, and 
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4 Table 1 of Annex I of the draft Regulation.  
5 A maximum delay of up until the end of the second trading day 
following the day on which the trade was executed applies. The 
European Commission has taken a relative, not absolute, view of 
trade size when considering deferred publication. In order to 
qualify for deferred publication, what matters more than ticket 
size is the ratio of the ticket size to the average daily turnover in 
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of a third party, or proprietary arrangements. The criteria 
for making this information public are set in Art. 32, which 
states that:  
-  the procedures must be in place to check that the 
information published is reliable and monitored 
continuously for errors; 
-  consolidation of data with similar data from other 
sources must be facilitated; 
-  information must be available to the public on a non-
discriminatory basis at a reasonable cost. 
Transparency measures aimed at overcoming market 
fragmentation rely on an efficient market-data 
infrastructure spanning trading venues, and inter-linking 
them in real time through regular, accurate, complete and 
simultaneous information flows. With the MiFID, 
European regulators decided that by dismantling the 
concentration rule, the benefits of a competitive 
information market outweighed the potential risks. 
Nevertheless, they hedged the risk of market fragmentation 
damaging those benefits by introducing a strict pre- and 
post-trade transparency regime for equity transactions, also 
for internalisers. 
The means through which post-trade information should be 
published, how widely post-trade information should be 
disseminated, and to whom it should be accessible was left 
undefined. These are questions which the directive leaves 
unanswered, with the result that the optimal degree of 
regulatory intervention in the field of trade data 
transparency will be a difficult equilibrium to find. That a 
discussion has now arisen around a particular transparency 
issue – the required degree of market data consolidation – 
is therefore not in the least surprising.  
Further to a consultation of market participants, CESR 
came to the conclusion, for the time being at least, that no 
binding measures were needed to ensure data quality, 
consolidation, and dissemination, but that a series of 
guidelines and recommendations would suffice (CESR, 
2007). They comprise data quality, publication 
arrangements, availability of transparency information, and 
publication standards. To facilitate data consolidation, 
CESR proposed that investment firms that internalise trades 
or trade OTC use only one primary publication channel. In 
addition, CESR considered it useful for data consolidators 
to ‘flag a trade’ of which they are the primary publication 
channel. This should allow data consolidators to distinguish 
between primary and secondary publication and limit the 
risk of duplication.  
As regards the time limit for the availability of trade 
information, the CESR guidelines restate the maximum 3 
minutes of the implementing regulation, but that as a rule it 
should go much faster. Inadequate technology cannot be 
used as an argument “for publication close to three minutes 
on a frequent basis”. In addition, CESR states that the 
supply of pre- and post-trade information cannot be made 
conditional on the purchase of other services (Guideline 9). 
Other guidelines concern the need for an ongoing process 
of verification by data providers, contingency procedures 
and the use of industry standards.
6 
The UK FSA took a diametrically opposed route to CESR, 
and proposed binding rules for data providers in order to 
ensure data quality and to counter fragmentation. The FSA 
claims that the expected growth of off-exchange trading 
will increase the probability of data fragmentation. This 
will “reduce market transparency, hinder price discovery 
and undermine equity market efficiency”, which will make 
it harder for firms to check best execution. Data should 
continue to be monitored effectively, also under MiFID, 
and the FSA argues that it cannot afford to take the risk of 
waiting to see if market forces will deliver a solution: 
“acting to consolidate after fragmentation has occurred 
would be more costly” (FSA, 2006, pp. 103-104). 
Consequently, the FSA introduced minimum standards for 
data consolidators, which it terms Trade Data Monitors 
(TDMs), which will come into force with MiFID in 
November 2007 (FSA, 2007, pp. 59-63). Before authorising 
a TDM, the FSA will make a series of assessments 
covering security of information, data integrity, timely 
dissemination, systems and resources and contingency 
planning. A TDM must make trade information available 
on a reasonable non-discriminatory commercial basis, in a 
manner which is easily accessible to other market 
participants. TDMs would be responsible for monitoring in 
real-time the trades reported to them for errors, and for 
contacting the reporting firm for correcting the trade 
information. The FSA says it does not intend to limit the 
number of TDMs, and that they could also be non-UK 
based entities.  
The FSA was therefore not prepared to wait for the 
outcome of report, requested of the Commission under Art. 
65.4 of MiFID one year after the entry into force of the 
Directive, i.e. in October 2008, “on the state of the removal 
of the obstacles which may prevent the consolidation at the 
European level of the information that trading venues are 
required to publish.” Although it judged the risk too high to 
wait, it is in fact another example of gold-plating, in 
addition to the four that were formally communicated by 
the FSA to the European Commission further to Art. 4 of 
the 2006 MiFID implementing Directive (FSA, 31 January 
2007), but in this case, it was for a matter covered by the 
implementing regulation. It could also be seen as a way to 
protect the data services of the London Stock Exchange, 
which is today doing what a TDM would be expected to do 
when MiFID comes into force. One can already wonder 
how TDMs will work for foreign firms, such as non-UK 
exchanges, which are selling data on the UK market. Will 
non-UK consolidators need to have an FSA license? How 
will the UK FSA monitor compliance of consolidators 
established outside the UK? In the next section, we give our 
response to these questions. 
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back-office post-trade reporting with the ISO 15022 and 20022 
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3.  Will a market-led approach to data 
consolidation work? 
A comparison with the debt markets does not immediately 
offer any reassurance that a market-led approach to post-
trade data consolidation will work.
7 Debt markets, which 
mostly take place OTC and are decentralised over a 
multitude of trading venues, are hardly a good example of a 
transparent market, despite initiatives underway to increase 
their level of transparency. Retail investors lack good data 
on bond markets, and no consolidated data sources exist to 
verify best execution, which will be required under MiFID. 
The FSA, which argues that it is too risky to wait for equity 
market data to fragment and to affect price formation and 
market efficiency, may thus have a point when it is 
proposing to set criteria for TDMs. 
However, price transparency now essentially concerns 
equity markets, and they remain fundamentally different 
from debt markets. Transactions in the latter still take place 
predominantly OTC, are characterised by a multitude of 
instruments and maturities, and only a fraction of the debt 
securities outstanding are traded regularly. Equity securities 
are much more homogeneous, they are traded much more 
frequently, and there are probably only about 500 highly 
liquid European stocks. 
In this sense, we would argue that the FSA initiative is 
premature and even poses risks to pan-European 
consolidation. It is likely that the markets will adapt to the 
new environment, for a variety of reasons:  
1)  As exchanges are expected to remain the main source 
of liquidity and price formation after MiFID, they will 
also be the primary source of the trade data. 
2)  There are competitors to the data aggregation activities 
of exchanges in the market, which have the necessary 
structure and processes in place, and the incentives to 
react. 
3)  MiFID creates the possibility for new providers to enter 
the market. 
Most studies so far agree that exchanges will remain the 
main source of liquidity after MiFID (see, for example, JP 
Morgan, 2006). This means that their trade data will also 
remain qualitatively the best. So exchanges can be expected 
to continue to benefit from network effects. However, the 
revenues derived from these services can be expected to 
decline. Exchanges will need to be more active to sell their 
services and buy data from internalisers, whereas they used 
to get this for free in the past. And there will be more 
competitors active in the data market to take a slice of this 
market. On the other hand, as trading volumes are expected 
to grow with MiFID as a result of increased competition 
and lower transaction costs, so will the market for market 
data. In addition, because of the conduct of business and 
best execution rules, banks will need to check trades more 
regularly and maintain records, thereby reinforcing demand 
again. 
Apart from the exchanges, data vendors and other firms can 
also be expected to react to the opening-up of the market 
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Policy Brief by Jean-Pierre Casey (2006). 
for equity market data. The Reuters and Bloomberg will 
certainly not step aside, as the data can be commercialised 
and because this has been their core business for many 
years. Other firms too, which are active in IT or consulting, 
may see this as an opportunity to develop new products and 
enter the market for data. Banks themselves may see this as 
an interesting proposition to make money from market data, 
a market which can be expected to grow with MiFID. The 
announcement of Project Boat fits in with this. 
In addition, it is not as though data are of top quality today. 
In markets not applying the concentration rule, trades 
executed off-market are not necessarily reported or 
incorporated rapidly in the on-market statistics. The 
extensive use of off-exchange trading in the German inter-
dealer and institutional market means that many trades 
currently go unreported. In the UK, off-exchange trading is 
mostly reported through the London Stock Exchange, but 
non-domestic trades will surface, which today account for 
8% of overall trade volume.
8 Hence MiFID, by allowing 
commercialisation of market data, could improve market 
data and quality. 
But there are certainly drawbacks and risks to a market-led 
approach, the most important ones being data quality and 
the lack of technical standardisation. As trades diverge over 
a multitude of venues, trade data quality may diminish, 
making the best execution requirement, which applies 
across markets, more difficult to ensure. Will exchanges 
and data aggregators be capable of consolidating this 
information at a high level? As data become proprietary, 
exchanges may no longer be interested in paying to 
aggregate the data from third parties. In addition, there is 
the question of the public availability of market data. These 
are issues that are probably best left to the European 
Commission to address in its 2008 review. However, 
setting unilateral national standards, as the FSA proposes to 
do, constitutes an obstacle to European consolidation.
9 
Although the FSA says its standards are optional, it is 
difficult to see how a data provider would not be bound by 
these rules, or how a bank could use a non-licensed data 
provider to monitor best execution. 
4.  Market data consolidation under the US 
NMS rule 
The EU’s approach differs radically from what is in place 
in the US, and what is being put in place in the context of 
the Reg NMS (‘National Market System’). The US requires 
mandatory consolidation of market data in a mutualised 
entity, and has a complex formula-based system in place to 
allocate the revenues to the nine self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs) that feed the data into the plan and set 
the pricing.  
                                                        
8 Securities Industry News, 27 January 2007. 
9 If other national regulators decide to follow the FSA example by 
imposing national standards, it seems inevitable that MiFID’s 
intention of achieving pan-European data consolidation will be 
made more difficult, if not impossible. It could also be argued that 
the FSA initiative goes against the EU’s E-commerce Directive 
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The rules, adopted under Rules 601 and 603 of Regulation 
NMS as well as joint industry plans, are designed to 
promote the wide availability of market data. They should 
strengthen the existing market data system, which provides 
investors in the US equity markets with real-time access to 
the best quotations and most recent trades in the thousands 
of NMS stocks throughout the trading day. For each stock, 
quotations and trades are continuously collected from many 
different trading centres and then disseminated to the public 
in a consolidated stream of data. As a result, investors of all 
types have access to a reliable source of information for the 
best prices in NMS stocks. When Congress mandated the 
creation of the NMS in 1975, it noted that the systems for 
disseminating consolidated market data would “form the 
heart of the national market system”.
10 
A single consolidator model for the dissemination of 
market data remains, however, very controversial. As with 
other networks, it exposes the problems a single entity can 
cause.
11 For a European reader, not only does it appear to 
be alien to the US system, it also means that competition is 
removed in data markets, which may negatively impact on 
the quality of the data and increase prices. In addition, all 
sources of data must be accessed and all data bought, and 
users retain less freedom to develop quotation and trade 
data that is best tailored to their users. This means higher 
data fees for the end user, since the distributor/vendor must 
subscribe to all data sources. Furthermore, the complex 
pricing system leads to gaming (‘tape shredding’) and 
distortion, since the SROs have no incentive to lower their 
pricing.
12 
In consultations in the US with market participants 
regarding a proposal to overhaul the existing consolidation, 
several market commentators argued for a competing 
consolidators model, where pricing and consolidation 
specifications are determined by market forces. Several 
commentators, for example, were convinced that the level 
of the fees was too high. Following the recommendations 
of an ad-hoc committee, the SEC considered that the single 
consolidator model was to be preferred, as it benefits 
investors, particularly retail, to help them to assess quotes 
prices when they place an order and to evaluate the best 
execution of their orders.
13 Changes to that model would 
thus compromise the integrity and reliability of the 
consolidated data stream, according to the SEC. 
5. Conclusion 
The opening-up of the market for equity market data is part 
of the MiFID revolution, but the impact on the market 
                                                        
10 SEC, Release No. 34-51808, File No. S7-10-04, p. 30 
11 It is interesting to note that in the area of securities settlement, 
the US also has a single entity, whereas the EU has competing 
entities.  
12 For a detailed discussion on this question, see Nina Mehta, 
“Reg NMS to drive tighter markets”, Traders Magazine (2006). 
13 The Seligman Committee (or Market’s Data Advisory 
Committee) was instituted by the SEC in 2001 to advise on the 
market data structure in the US. Interesting to note is that 
although a majority of members of the Committee apparently 
favoured a competing consolidators approach, the Committee did 
not formally propose it.  
structure is difficult to forecast. It can be expected that 
exchanges will fight to defend their position, but they will 
certainly lose revenues from data vending, and may be 
forced to consolidate this activity with other operators. 
Many other groups are, however, preparing to enter into 
that market or to increase their market-share, which should 
give comfort to regulators. In addition, the competitive 
effects of MiFID could improve data quality and 
availability. 
The European Commission and CESR will have to closely 
monitor market developments and data quality in the 
months following the entry into force of MiFID. The 
maintenance of a single consolidator model in the US is a 
useful reminder that the most developed capital market in 
the world chose a radically different model from the EU. 
The UK’s FSA, with its regime for Trade Data Monitors, 
opted for a model of regulated competition, although this 
raises serious questions from a single market perspective, 
as it is in fact another example of national gold-plating, or 
silver-plating in this case (since it is optional), but it is still 
difficult to see how a data provider would not be bound by 
these rules.   
Another item to watch is data pricing. How prices will 
move is difficult to predict, but competition and the arrival 
of newcomers should keep them in line. Pricing will need 
to be watched in particular in relation to smaller players, as 
they will need similar access to data as their larger 
competitors to guarantee best execution, but may not have 
the same market power. Competition authorities will thus 
have to watch carefully how markets will adapt.  
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European capital markets have experienced rapid growth in recent years, corresponding 
to the gradual shift away from relationship banking as a source of funding and at the 
same time, have had to absorb and implement the massive output of EU-level regulation 
required to create a single market for financial services. These developments, combined 
with the immense challenges presented to European financial institutions by the 
globalisation of financial markets, highlight the importance of an independent entity to 
undertake and disseminate research on European capital markets. 
The principal objective of ECMI is therefore to provide a forum in which market 
participants, policy-makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions 
concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and competitiveness of 
European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. These exchanges are 
fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly 
newsletters, annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research 
papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European 
regulators on policy-related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between 
academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional approach to the subject. 
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